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Chapter 2: Why Mass Murder Happened 
 
Anger, as Seneca observed in the first century, was the worst plague of humanity: 
‘Behold the most glorious cities whose foundations can scarcely be traced – anger 
cast them down. Behold solitudes stretching lonely for many miles without a single 
dweller – anger laid them to waste.’1 In The Etymologies, an encyclopedic and widely 
read compilation of knowledge made in the seventh century, Isidore of Seville 
declared that ‘[a]n unjust war is one that is begun out of rage, and not for a lawful 
reason’.2 It is little wonder then that contemporary observers of the Italian Wars often 
blamed anger or ‘fury’ for the eruptions of violence which laid waste to their towns. 
Modern historians have also focused on the ‘frustration’ and ‘blind aggression’, the 
‘bitterness and anger’ of troops at the end of a long siege which might have 
contributed to the cause, course and extent of the massacre and sack of towns. As 
mentioned in the introduction, this hydraulic approach to violence suggests how 
troops frustrated by a long siege might be impelled to sack a city with frenzied and 
fatal violence, or why they might be spurred on to ‘indiscriminate violence’ by the 
‘catharsis of passing through the killing ground of the breach and emerging 
unscathed’.3  
But soldiers’ appetites and passions, as they would have been termed in the 
Renaissance, are only one part of the story of why mass murder happened. Anger and 
bloodlust did not operate in isolation from other factors, and their expression was 
conditioned and shaped by the structures of power from the prince downwards, as 
well as by the structures of military life, from supply and pay to the order and 
discipline expected before a besieged town. In this chapter, attention is paid to the 
calculation and appraisal, ideas and goals, structure and logic involved in acts which 
observers were sometimes tempted to view simply as irrational outbursts of 
aggression.4 
This overview therefore highlights the nature of princely assumptions about 
the close relationship between authority and violence, which were made clear in the 
literature of just war theory and other legal texts further explored in chapter 4. It also 
demonstrates how the conventions of the siege and sack, including the parley or 
negotiation, were deeply imbued with menace and terror and with customs of cruelty 
towards civilians. Finally, this account of why mass murder happened shows how 
military structures of the Renaissance armies entailed threat towards civilians and 
how, at certain times and in certain conditions of prolonged occupation, this could 
break out into calculated fury and violence. 
 
1. Fury and Calculation 
 
Contemporary accounts of violence during the Italian Wars often convey an 
impression of ferocity and anger which seems to have little in common with military 
discipline, negotiations for plunder or human morality, and are more akin to 
disorderly expressions of hatred and anger. For example, in his ‘solemn and highly 
polished’ history of the Italian Wars, De bello Italico (On the Italian War) (c.1507), 
the exiled Florentine humanist Bernardo Rucellai recounted the sack and massacre of 
the town of Gaeta, situated between the cities of Rome and Naples, which rebelled 
against the French in June 1495:  
 
In fact from the outset the experienced French soldiers, knowing that the 
enemy troops were close by, formed a wedge as the situation and the place 
required, ready to repel the assault, since only with such virtue lay the hope of 
salvation. Then, when that dread left their minds fear quickly turned to anger, 
to stir their spirits, to proclaim victory in their usual way, and to lead them in 
disarray against the inhabitants of the town. Some blocked the exits to streets, 
a few of which contained a great number; others rushed down from the 
heights, and then so many with all their force invaded everywhere terrorizing 
enemy non-combatants [imbellem hostem] with their resolution and terrible 
cries, making great insults accusing them of cowardice, they carried around 
heads on lances, lifting swords covered in blood in menacing acts towards the 
same heads. The battle was more miserable for the horror of civic destruction. 
It was fought in a narrow place. Everything echoed with discordant voices, 
groans, cries of women, laments of babies. The besieged were in an 
advantageous position and number, the French were superior in military 
valour, and the desire to plunder did not delay anyone.5 
 
Lacking a commander the Gaetani were defeated and turned on each other, or fled in 
all directions, even into the midst of the enemy, in their extreme and disorientating 
fear. All were killed: good and bad, virtuous and vile, armed and unarmed, lay and 
religious (even while praying), old and young. Rucellai concluded: ‘There was rarely 
more cruel ferocity in the memory of man.’6  
 In fact, ‘fury’ was the most frequent contemporary explanation for the 
massacres of the Italian Wars decades before Francesco Guicciardini in his History of 
Italy condemned the ‘innate fury’ of the French which led them to burn down Monte 
San Giovanni in 1495.7 Indeed, the natural bellicosity of the French was an ancient 
topos.8 In his History of Rome Livy described the Gauls as being ‘consumed with 
wrath (a passion which their race is powerless to control)’ and shocking the Romans 
more with terror than with strength when they sacked Rome in 390 BC. According to 
Livy the audacious Romans were favoured by fortune and led by the dictator Marcus 
Furius Camillus who took advantage of the Gauls’ lack of organisation in war to 
repulse them.9 Guicciardini’s fellow Florentine Niccolò Machiavelli observed in The 
Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livy (written c.1513-17) that Livy had 
several times commented ‘that the French are more than men at the beginning of the 
fight, and in the succeeding combat they come out less than women’. While the 
Romans combined fury with a military discipline that gave them victories, 
Machiavelli wrote, and the modern Italians had neither fury nor order, the French had 
ferocity but no order and so ultimately failed in combat.10  
This French fury was sometimes invoked in a monitory way. In 1494 one 
chronicler described the warning given by Gaspare da Sanseverino, called the Boaster 
(‘Fracasso’) – a man of such military gruffness that Caterina Sforza reputedly 
suggested that he should be oiled and put away with his other arms during 
peacetime.11 Gaspare met with the castellans of Mordano (in the territory of Caterina 
Sforza who had come out in favour of the Neapolitans) and ‘commanded that they 
would make no treaty, because he came on behalf of his majesty the king of France 
and his league and begged that they give them the castles; and if not, then he had 
brought fourteen thousand persons to join battle.’12 The castellans refused to 
surrender and so the Boaster warned: 
 
My men, it is well known to us that you are all valiant men; however, take my 
advice – you ought not to wait for the French army because they are like rabid 
dogs and because they are bound by an agreement among us to go into battle. 
As soon as you are conquered by them, everything will be put to fire and sack 
and forced at the sword’s edge because we cannot restrain them for anything 
given that they who have not offered themselves to our chiefs in these past 
days have been conquered. So dear brothers the eternal God gives you good 
opportunity to plead a good case for all these miserable castles.’13 
 
This warning was borne out by the subsequent sack and massacre at Mordano. 
Bernardo Dovizi da Bibbiena, who was based in the opposing Neapolitan camp, wrote 
to Piero de’ Medici a few days after this event to confirm that ‘the French were the 
first to enter [the town] and acted with some cruelty towards our own [Italians] so that 
this news has brought some dismay to the spirits of each one of these soldiers [in 
camp].’14 The French, he related in another letter, not only fought to the death with 
the Lombard troops but ‘killed I don’t know how many women and children, even if a 
few, and they used such cruelties that they have revolted everyone, with the happy 
outcome that great and small have conceived a great hatred for the French.’15 
Subsequent reports suggested that ‘very many’ French – perhaps 130, 150, or 300 – 
had drowned or burnt to death in Mordano and that the ‘most evil words’ were now 
passing between the French and Lombards in the French camp.16 
This stereotype of French military fury was sometimes assigned to specific 
regions. For example, several commentators referring to Capua and other sacks and 
massacres singled out Gascon, Picard, and Norman infantry for blame. The Gascons 
were generally considered fine troops, perhaps because they were hardened and 
rendered battle ready by the location of Gascony on the troubled frontier with Spain.17 
In his account of France written in c.1512 Machiavelli remarked that the Gascons 
were a little better than the run of French troops for this reason, but looking at their 
behaviour in recent years he claimed that they had proved themselves to be more like 
thieves than valiant men, and were more suitable for defending and assaulting places 
than for open battle.18 It seems that the temporary bands of infantry raised for 
successive French campaigns in Italy and called adventurers (‘aventuriers’) were 
largely made up of Gascons, Picards, and Normans and associated with pillaging and 
other examples of poor discipline.19 The legions that fought in the Italian campaigns 
of 1536-7, created in France by an ordinance of 1534, were raised from a broader 
range of frontier and coastal provinces, but they also gained a reputation for 
indiscipline with Gascons leading one mutiny in 1536 against regulations prohibiting 
the pillaging of munition merchants.20 
 However, for all these assumptions and accusations military violence could be 
purposive, planned, applied with calculation, and imbued with a sense of honour. In 
these respects the violence is comparable to Spanish mutinies during the war in the 
Flanders examined by Geoffrey Parker and to similar events in Lombardy and Sicily 
in the 1530s that led to violence against civilians, including mass murder.21 Thus, the 
historian Bernardo Rucellai also suggested that calculation and a sense of honour 
could drive military massacres. He attributed the massacre at Gaeta in 1495 to the 
defection of the town from French rule and he assigned to the French not only a 
natural ferocity but also endowed them with a sense of honour and a desire for 
vengeance which impelled and shaped their actions: 
 
The French, after the victory over the townspeople, became cruel over them 
all more bitterly since their spirits were irritated by their defection and they 
thought it a duty to vindicate the injury received and at the same time the 
massacre of this most noble city would terrorize the others so that nobody 
would dare to do anything similar. A naturally fierce people and mindful of 
their ancient virtue they did not tolerate that the honour of war be taken from 
them. In this way anger at the betrayal led to crimes of many sorts and they 
were sated only with blood. Nothing cruel, foul or abominable against men, 
women, or children was omitted; no differentiation was made between sacred 
and profane things, and nobody would have survived unless day had given 
way to night.22  
 
Rucellai wrote about the massacre at Monte San Giovanni by the French in 1494 with 
similar care. In his account, every adult except one was killed, and everything was put 
to fire and destroyed:  
 
The most atrocious sort of cruelty occurred: babies ripped from the breasts of 
their parents and taken into slavery, parents killed under the eyes of their sons, 
wretched mothers dragged from the last embrace of their children, with silent 
sadness in the useless wait to be able to welcome the last breath, nuns 
terrorized and chased from their sanctuaries and slaughtered before their 
venerated saints, with mingled cries, laments, and groans throughout the town. 
But the French, by nature fierce and violent, think that it contributed to a 
victorious conclusion of the war by testing the obstinate spirit of the towns 
with savage destruction and strengthening the soldiers will to sack, since they 
were henceforth more ready to confront every danger.23 
 
Fury was here once again coupled with military expediency and exigency as soldiers 
tested their mettle in anticipation of the remainder of the campaign and starkly 
demonstrated to other Italian towns their ability to overcome resistance. 
The artfully stylized representations of the massacre by historians, poets and 
artists with their roots in scriptural, classical and medieval texts and images will be 
analysed in much more detail in part IV. In the remainder of this chapter, though, the 
evidence of contemporary chronicles, dispatches, and letters by key players such as 
Charles VIII or Louis XII will form the basis for a reconstruction of the practices of 
warfare, and especially mass murder, during the Italian Wars. These sources, with 
their references to innate French fury for example, reveal the outlines of the rhetorical 
construction of the massacre; but they also provide a sense of its actual form. It seems 
as if the explanations for the violence of the French rehearsed by Rucellai and other 
historians often reflected the realities of organized and calculated military violence 
against civilians driven by a deliberate strategy of terror, the structures of negotiation, 
the desire for revenge or punishment, a thirst for plunder, and a sense of national or 
ethnic honour. 
 
2. The Strategy of Terror 
 
The strategic use of terror against garrisons and other relatively strong points was 
particularly marked during the first period of the French military presence in Italy up 
until around 1500. Indeed, the ‘destruction-and-subjugation dynamic’ in the form of 
the massacre of civilians has an established place in warfare.24 Medieval terror should 
be distinguished from the modern sense of predominantly bottom up violence and 
understood as essentially ‘instrumental’, wielded by those at the top as well as at the 
bottom or at the margins of society, and inspiring dread in individuals or groups of 
higher, lower, or equal status in order to obtain the desired end of imposing, 
protecting, or overthrowing social, religious, or political order.25  
Terror of this kind was a familiar, indeed central, element of medieval warfare 
and it often came into play when a garrison or town resisted an attacking army and 
had to be taken by force, when the parley or negotiations to create a new relationship 
between the two sides failed, or when an escalade or rapid scaling of the walls began. 
The strategic destruction of a garrison or town citadel in this way could neutralize it 
as a threat, but just as importantly it could serve as a warning and encourage other 
towns to surrender.26 The strategy of exemplary or strategic terror in this way was 
familiar to French commanders. For example, during the ‘mad war’ with Brittany in 
1488 Charles VIII’s commander Louis II de La Trémoille had ordered the city of 
Rennes, subject to a rebellious duke, to surrender or face ‘such a punishment that the 
memory of it will be an example to all the others.’27  
In this respect, the commander was an expression of princely authority. In 
medieval literature the king’s anger was often presented as a licit display of passion, 
which could lead to a display of cruelty that reflected divine anger and the desire for 
justice.28 Royal violence, such as the actual or threatened destruction of towns in the 
Low Countries in the course of the fifteenth century by the Burgundian dukes of the 
House of Valois, could be a means to assert control and sovereignty with the 
legitimation of Roman legal practices.29 
More prosaically, the logistics of supply and the mechanics of warfare in the 
Middle Ages also involved a considerable element of terror.30 The poor or irregular 
payment of troops forced men to live off the land during the campaign and exploit 
townspeople, especially during winter quartering. During the Hundred Years’ War 
France’s many towns, often well-fortified, necessitated siege warfare and slowed 
down the enemy forces, forcing them to live off the land, whether friendly or in 
enemy hands, and to impose hardships on the non-combatants within the walls.31 As 
the war developed into one of conquest during the fifteenth century English 
commanders might sometimes deplore soldierly indiscipline and the exploitation of 
peasants, and might attempt to regulate plunder and the treatment of peasants, but the 
lack of regular pay always undermined these efforts.32 It was this fact that led 
Christine de Pizan in Le livre des fais d’armes et de chevalerie (The Book of Deeds of 
Arms and of Chivalry) (c.1406, first printed in 1488) to urge princes to pay their 
troops adequately in order to prevent pillaging.33 
Clifford J. Rogers has argued that the devastation and massacres of the 
Hundred Years’ War also had strategic value. The chevauchées or raids which 
inflicted violence on civilians and their property were a means of underlining the 
weakness of the Valois monarchy by demonstrating its failure to protect its people or 
to defeat the English in battle. The devastation of the countryside therefore went 
beyond the pillaging simply required to keep an army on the move (and may even 
have damaged supply lines) but such economic attrition harmed the French treasury. 
The English crown therefore accepted as strategically useful the activity of the 
routiers or rovers who relied on the violent extraction of ‘protection money’ or 
ransoms and truce payments, from local communities. The use of such violence 
against towns and townspeople by the army, routiers, and free companies could be 
viewed as a ‘strategy of precedent’ by which garrisons or inhabitants would be 
convinced that they were better off surrendering than fighting.34 
In 1494 the strategy was favoured by the military landscape Charles found on 
the Italian peninsula. As Philippe Contamine has noted: ‘During the second half of the 
fifteenth century garrisons had a tendency to multiply.’35 In France these garrison 
establishments were related to the rise of a more permanent army, the pressing need to 
defend extensive frontiers, and the desire to assert royal authority in waging war. 
Contamine has estimated that by the last quarter of the century the French monarchy 
maintained permanent forces of twenty to twenty-five thousand men, or perhaps 1% 
of the adult male population between 18 and 45 years of age.36 The Venetian, 
Florentine, and Neapolitan states did not reach these levels of permanent forces but 
they established or fortified garrisons, citadels, and other strong points during the 
fifteenth century and maintained forces directly under their command (sometimes 
called lanze spezzate).37 Therefore, once they had crossed the Alps the French had as 
objects for attack a series of targets closely associated with princely authority,38 and 
the civilians who took advantage of these fortified places for protection, or who 
serviced the troops were considered little more than collateral damage.39 
As suggested in chapter 1 the French strategy of terror also made sense in the 
fragmented political landscape of Italy. First of all, the internal political divisions 
characteristic of many Italian towns could aid and exacerbate mass violence.40 At 
Brescia in 1509 occupying French troops, encouraged by the so-called Gambareschi 
(named after the prominent Gambara family which was hostile to the rule of Venice), 
raided the city’s munitions, opened the prison, and plundered the palace of the 
podestà or rector.41 The popolo were said to be loyal to Venice and the returning 
podestà told the Venetians that when the king of France appeared in the city nobody 
cried ‘Franza’ except seven or eight persons. The podestà also claimed that on his 
way out of the city men and women had blessed him from their balconies and showed 
great sadness and he placed all the blame for the loss of the city on the Gambareschi 
who hated Venice.42 During the bloody sack three years later these old enmities and 
vendettas were played out and every quarter apart from the Ghibelline neighbourhood 
known as the cittadella and some houses of the Gambareschi was put to the sack.43 
Letters to Venice soon brought accounts of the Ghibellines in the cittadella 
enthusiastically chanting ‘Franza, Franza.’44 
Charles VIII and other princes greatly benefited from the broader pattern of 
shifting alliances and rivalries of the great powers on the peninsula including Milan, 
Florence, Venice and Naples, and could take advantage of the services of disgruntled 
exiles keen for regime change at home.45 These princes also reaped rewards on a 
smaller scale from the unstable patchwork of signorial power, especially in the papal 
states and the Romagna.46 The arrival of the French could therefore break open old 
wounds to their advantage, or encourage expedient changes of loyalty. Thus in 1494 
the Ferrarese ambassador reported from Rome about the sense of panic spreading in 
the city as the French moved through the territories of the powerful Orsini and 
Colonna clans within the papal states, with rumours flying about to the effect that 
these powerful families had come to some agreement to plunder the lands around 
Rome.47  
The example of the sack and massacre of Fivizzano, a garrison on the frontier 
of Florentine territory, usefully illustrates many of the foregoing points. It was said in 
1494 that Charles VIII could expect little resistance when he entered Florentine 
territory, which was traditionally favourable to the French. Indeed, one printed 
campaign bulletin of the time noted that ‘the towns have weak walls, lack openings 
[for artillery], boulevards, and ditches. Moreover, three parts and a half are pro-
French.’48 This was not entirely true and when the king and his army entered 
Florentine territory in October 1494 they were faced by the impressive strongholds of 
Sarzana and Pietrasanta. The Florentines had spent a great deal of their considerable 
wealth fortifying these places to the extent that they would not fall easily under 
bombardment. Charles therefore simply turned his attention to Fivizzano where the 
strategy of terror and massacre was used effectively. The choice of ‘sacrificial victim’ 
in this instance was carefully calculated: Fivizzano had been seized by the Florentines 
from a branch of the Malaspina family, which was close to Ludovico Sforza, and it 
also formed a threatening bridgehead into the territory of a Ferrarese ally.49 
Francesco Guicciardini – not incidentally a Florentine – later presented the 
massacre at Fivizzano as a symbol of the new violence of war. It will be recalled that 
he claimed that the entire foreign garrison and many inhabitants were killed, ‘a thing 
unheard of and very frightening in Italy, which for a long time had been used to 
seeing wars staged with beautiful pomp and display, not unlike spectacles, rather than 
waged with bloodshed and dangers’.50 Contemporary sources reveal a rather more 
complex picture. The Florentine diarist Piero Parenti noted that the sack and massacre 
at Fivizzano was the work of the inhabitants of neighbouring Fosdinuovo rather than 
the French.51 According to contemporary reports the marchese of Fosdinuovo, 
Gabriele Malaspina, and his associates wished to hold the territory for themselves and 
archival evidence indicates that Malasapina played a double game with all sides in the 
conflict in order to maximize his territorial advantage in the Lunigiana and ultimately, 
if briefly, to gain Fivizzano from Florence with the approval of Milan.52 
Moreover, Matteo Maria Boiardo, Estense governor in Reggio Emilia (and 
author of the chivalric romance Orlando innamorato), reported that both before and 
after its sack representatives of Fivizzano had come to him in the name of the 
commune asking to become subjects of the duke of Ferrara. He added that they were 
now obliged within fifteen days to pay the French ten thousand ducats for the release 
of twenty-four men held ransom and for the recovery of their possessions.53 Boiardo 
had at first advised these representatives that the duke’s understanding (‘bona 
intelligentia’) with the Florentines and other powers prevented him from acting on 
this request, but when they came to see him after the sack they pointed out that the 
territory was no longer Florentine and that the duke could treat directly with the 
French king.54 Boiardo now wrote to the duke of Ferrara, Ercole I d’Este, in rather 
tempting terms about this ‘good place’ (‘bono logo’) which could pay such a ransom 
and offer such a fine stronghold.55 
In addition, it should be observed that a month before the massacre at 
Fivizzano the second main column of the French forces proceeding southwards had 
already put Mordano to the fire and sword. As the assiduous observer of the wars 
Marin Sanudo remarked a few years later, the French at Mordano resolved to move on 
to other towns and act in the same way if they did not surrender.56 Philippe de 
Commynes, the leading French diplomat in Sanudo’s home town of Venice during 
this period, also noted that the bombardment and sacking of the town caused its lady 
Caterina Sforza to join the French side, while the ‘use of great guns’ here gave the 
Italians ‘new courage’ and caused then to ‘be desirous of change’.57 The strategy 
helped to neutralize resistance to the invading forces in the Romagna.58  
The ferocity of Charles’ troops at Mordano and Fivizzano in 1494 therefore 
helped him to avoid much further bloodshed in Florentine territory. Piero de’Medici, 
the de facto ruler of Florence after Lorenzo’s death, agreed to surrender the fortresses 
of Sarzana, Pietrasanta, Pisa, and Livorno for the remainder of the French campaign.59 
The French then turned with similar effect against the stronghold of Monte San 
Giovanni, a feudal possession of the D’Avalos family on the road through the papal 
states on the way to the Neapolitan prize. Guillaume de Villeneuve, who was in the 
French army during the campaign, noted in his memoirs (written in captivity and 
completed in 1497) that ‘for certain injuries and other great displeasures that they had 
done to the king, and because they declared themselves his enemy’ the king had the 
place bombarded. The king then ordered an assault, which was promptly executed by 
captains and warriors ‘who only asked to be able to acquire honour and serve their 
king and sovereign lord’. The bitterness with which the place was put to fire and 
blood, he wrote, was ‘to give an example to the others.’60 Philippe de Commynes later 
noted more specifically how the flight of the king of Aragon and opening of the way 
to Naples followed on from the bombardment, storm, and sack of this ‘strong place’.61 
The capture of Monte San Giovanni (together with that of Monte Fortino) was 
highlighted in printed bulletins coming out of Naples in March 1495, with one 
pamphleteer claiming that this strong town was taken at the loss of seven hundred of 
the enemy ‘with great vigour and audacity by the king’s men’ and to the astonishment 
of ‘all the Italies’, especially Naples.62 
The French returned to this successful strategy of terror during their second 
campaign in Italy during 1499-1502. As Franco-Venetian preparations for war in the 
Duchy of Milan developed in 1499 there were signs that the military tactic of 
murderous ‘shock and awe’, which had proved effective for Charles VIII, would be 
redeployed by his successor Louis XII as he worked to make good his hereditary 
claim on Milan.63 Francesco Gonzaga, the marquis of Mantua, who had lately 
returned from France told his brother that Louis ‘wished to come to the enterprise of 
Milan, and had told him of the way he wished to hold it, and desired to use with great 
cruelty the first territory he took by force so that the remainder would surrender.’64 It 
is revealing in this respect that the standard employed by the French general La 
Trémoille during this campaign depicted a bloody sword of vengeance, a torch and a 
whip.65 
 The experienced Milanese condottiero Gian Giacomo Trivulzio had greatest 
responsibility for implementing the French strategy of terror. One Venetian visitor to 
Trivulzio at the French fief of Asti reported in August 1499 that he had declared: ‘We 
shall go to Rocca d’Arazzo, and then take Annona, and finally Mortara, and every 
place that resists will be flattened’.66 However, the Mantuan ambassador also reported 
Trivulzio as saying that he had orders from Louis to shame nobody and to leave in 
liberty all of the conquered places, and it was said that the king was displeased with 
Trivulzio’s demolition of three castles.67 Around the same time it was reported that 
the French troops were treating ‘as friends’ those among whom they were encamped, 
and Trivulzio hanged one Frenchman who had kidnapped a woman. Perhaps Louis 
wished to make it clear that his hostility was directed towards Ludovico Sforza and 
not the people of the duchy – a strategy the Mantuan ambassador judged rather 
dangerous for the duke.68 
In any case, the experience of Italians in Rocca d’Arazzo, Annona, and 
elsewhere during this second campaign was as doleful as the first but these sacks and 
massacres helped to bring about the rapid surrender of Tortona, Alessandria, Pavia 
and Milan.69 To the south the pope’s son Cesare Borgia led a large force of French, 
Swiss, Norman and Gascon infantry, as well as twenty pieces of French artillery, as 
he attempted to carve out a principality in the Romagna.70 His lightning campaign 
against Imola, Forlì, Faenza, and Rimini combined bribery of castellans, the 
exploitation of local enmities and the use of fear and terror. Cesare Borgia’s cruel and 
tyrannical methods in Rimini, for example, were declared unknown for centuries and 
condemned by the Venetian Senate (at this time supporting the return of the Malatesta 
clan to rule that city) in an unsent letter to its ambassadors in Rome. The Senate noted 
that there had been ‘great slaughter [strage] and effusion of much blood of these poor 
citizens’ as a result of the actions of men entering there in the name of Cesare, and 
indeed it was reported by one chronicler that around 360 died.71 The ‘terrors’ used in 
Forlì and Faenza were later said to have caused other cities to capitulate to Cesare 
Borgia whose reputation for cruelty was now firmly established.72 
 Cesare and his men then joined with the French army to inflict a terrible 
devastation on the town of Capua in the ongoing campaign to take the kingdom of 
Naples. The diaries of many Italian contemporaries contain shocked reflections on the 
sack of Capua in 1501, in which thousands were thought to have perished.73 The 
terrible example of Capua provided the same lesson to Italians and French alike. 
Girolamo Priuli in Venice saw the cruel sack and ‘desolation’ (‘desolatione’) of the 
city as a cause for fear not only in the kingdom of Naples but also throughout Italy. It 
was certain, he wrote, that no other city would wait for the ulramontane ‘fury’ 
(‘impetto’) but would immediately surrender.74 Similarly, the French commander who 
took Capua reportedly led an emissary of the Neapolitan king through the city to 
show him the slaughters (‘strage’) and cruelties and said ‘Go and tell Naples that 
tomorrow I will be there with a camp at the walls, and worse will befall them if they 
wait for the artillery [before surrendering].’75 In fact, the Neapolitans were thrown 
into panic by the news of Capua and fled along the coast. King Federico ordered the 
surrender of the city and a large ransom was paid, but close watch was kept on the 
gates in case the adventurers (‘adventureri’) who had breached the walls of Capua 
attempted to do the same at Naples.76 
In general, the expediency of terror naturally struck princes and commanders 
forcefully and convincingly and it was often employed with palpable success. 
Moreover, any moral qualms were easily suppressed: in the wake of the sack of Prato 
in 1512 Cardinal Giovanni de’ Medici – soon to be elected Pope Leo X – wrote to the 
pope with rather chilling calculation that the Spanish had assaulted Prato with valour 
and had put the place to sack ‘not without some cruelty in killing, which was the least 
that could be done … The capture of Prato in such a sudden and cruel way, although 
it has displeased me, yet will have brought this benefit as an example and a terror to 
others.’77 
 
3. The Tactics of Negotiation 
 
The strategy of terror, often attributed to the French but evidently useful to all armies, 
involved a series of negotiations which could easily fail and even lead to mass 
murder. Captains were frequently reminded by armchair warriors as well as by 
experienced fighting men that even when a truce had been arranged, as in the case of 
besieged cities, the enemy might still cause harm and break it before peace had been 
finalized.78 The seasoned Gascon soldier Blaise de Monluc later warned that this was 
the moment to shore up defences since, as he put it proverbially: ‘Between the pear 
and the cheese the passage is tried’. When word of surrender circulated, it was 
claimed, the besieged often looked to secure their money and arms while the 
besiegers, who saw the hope for booty disappear in the event of a negotiated 
capitulation, might set about a violent sack.79 
The process of negotiation with towns and garrisons involved a number of 
traditional stages.80 The besieged were usually given an opportunity to surrender 
when a herald appeared before the town walls offering a treaty in their lord’s name 
and outlining the unfortunate consequences of refusal. The formal siege then began 
with the firing of a cannon and the commander could negotiate terms or assault the 
city. In the latter case, the city being as it were ‘guilty in defence’ like Shakespeare’s 
Harfleur before Henry V’s forces, the inhabitants would be given no quarter and the 
‘flesh’d soldier, rough and hard of heart, / in liberty of bloody hand [would] range 
with conscience wide as hell’.81 Alternatively, a suspension of hostilities might be 
negotiated and hostages exchanged and it was agreed that the town would be given up 
without plunder and violence if a relieving force did not arrive within a stated period 
to give battle.  
In practice, the local commander and townspeople faced a difficult choice 
since their ruler might punish them for surrendering to an enemy force prematurely 
or, once the siege had begun, surrendering quicker than customs suggested – one 
month was stipulated in a French military contract of 1431.82 The surrender could be 
deemed an act of treason in great dishonour to the ruler. A surrender might even be 
made once the assault was underway, but by this stage it is unlikely that the terms 
would favour the commander of the town, or be considered at all honourable. 
The breaking of the truce and the assault or storm of a town during a parley 
involving a defending commander and a clerical go-between was not uncommon and 
by convention it gave troops a free hand to plunder and inflict violence.83 A 
commander could blame this failure of negotiation on the eagerness of the troops 
themselves, or it might be a deliberate means of enriching troops who would 
otherwise miss out on any fines imposed by the captain at surrender.84 Furthermore, 
the escalade or storming of a town might occur when it had already given itself up 
peacefully and was not supposed to be plundered, or it might even be stormed during 
a truce when a period of plunder seems to have been allowed.85  
These events were usually announced by a cry, which signified the advance of 
troops and might be excused on the grounds of acting under the avowal of a party not 
covered by the truce.86 Since the particular truce, like the safe-conduct, bound only 
those under the authority of the commander who made it some troops could claim that 
spoil might legally be taken as they were still in a condition of war and not bound by 
the truce made by another commander.87 The truce might still hold if the breach was 
contained, but in the event of an escalade of a town the truce was rendered void.88 
There are many examples of the breakdown of talks, the failure of pacts, and 
sudden escalades by troops that led to sacks and massacres of towns during the Italian 
Wars.89 In a number of cases a town offered or paid protection money before a sack in 
order to secure itself. According to the Perugian chronicler Francesco Matarazzo the 
inhabitants of Foligno, terrified by the threat of sack, sent ambassadors to the ‘crypto-
Jewish pope’ (‘lo marano pontefice’) Alexander VI offering money to ensure that the 
French troops were diverted from their collision course with their territory; an offer 
that was gratefully received by this ‘source of greed’ (‘fons avaritiae’).90 Following 
the capture of Ludovico Sforza and the dispersal of his forces in April 1500 the 
French demanded indemnities from the cities which had betrayed them, including 
Milan where a feared sack soon materialized.91 This pattern of ‘demanding money 
with menaces’ was the form of protection which the French offered to many northern 
Italian powers during this period, and it doubtless stoked up resentment against 
them.92 In 1503 the town of Fano also attempted to avoid a sack by buying off one of 
Cesare Borgia’s commanders, but out of loyalty to their master the troops massacred 
the supposed followers of the disloyal condottieri whom Borgia had just had 
ruthlessly garotted at Senigallia.93 In 1512 Swiss troops in occupation in Pavia refused 
to leave the city until they had been paid and the inhabitants were forced to raise the 
money for this purpose, while in the same year Bergamo avoided a French sack by 
agreeing to a fine of 60,000 ducats.94 In the wake of victory in the battle outside Pavia 
in 1525 the Germans in the city refused to leave until they were paid, and a sack of 
the city was threatened but only averted when the imperial commanders promised 
payment within fifteen days.95 
In other cases, the differences between the civilian population and the 
castellan or commander provided armies before the walls with an opportunity. The 
inhabitants of Imola, hopeful of tax exemptions and hostile towards their young lord 
and the regent Caterina Sforza refused to supply the citadel, forced the gates opened 
to the army of Cesare Borgia, and even fought on its side.96 Around the same time 
badly paid troops in the Milanese strongholds of Rocca d’Arazzo and Annona 
rebelled and it was reported that the local inhabitants not only resented demands made 
on them to repair the fortifications but were reluctant, as at Imola, to bring the harvest 
into the fortresses.97 Rocca d’Arazzo then fell quickly, reportedly by the betrayal of a 
Genoese castellan bribed with 800 ducats. The French subsequently put the place to 
sack, killing men, women, and children and eliminating its garrison of 500 soldiers.98 
In 1499 the inhabitants of Forlì surrendered to Cesare Borgia on the understanding 
that his troops would remain outside of the walls, but his troops entered the town and 
besieged the citadel where Caterina Sforza held out until it was taken early the 
following year.99 As one eyewitness recalled this was not without ‘our great woe, 
which was similar to the pains of hell’ as cold and hungry troops sacked workshops, 
entered homes and ejected the inhabitants who sometimes resisted and tried to protect 
their daughters.100 Many inhabitants jumped from the walls to escape, or took refuge 
in the citadel, and it was ‘[a] cruel and impious thing to hear the cries and laments 
because they were covered in mud like pigs and [other] animals.’101 
In July 1496 during the conflict between Pisa and Florence the town of Ponte 
di Sacco was attacked by Florentines and under bombardment it was lost by the 
French and by Italian troops commanded by the duke of Urbino. A pact was agreed 
‘wealth and persons excepted’ (‘salvo l’avere e le persone’) in the usual phrase and 
fifty-four French were then shot dead in order to find the money they had supposedly 
swallowed. The Italians were stripped of their arms and money and then fled, while 
the whole area was put to the sack and the terms were not observed.102 Two weeks 
later the soldiers in neigbouring Palaia surrendered to the Florentines on the same 
terms (‘a patti, salvo l’avere e le persone’) and in order to be secure ‘they wished for 
sureties in the Cascina, and in this way they left, but they were all mostly French; and 
the sureties were [obtained] because at Ponte di Sacco the assurance was not observed 
and they were almost all killed by the Florentines [even] with this assurance.’103 This 
story, like the discovery of letter of August 1499 purportedly describing Florentine 
intentions to put rebellious Pisa to the sack, using cruelty, and giving up its women to 
the pleasure of the soldiers, may simply reflect the Pisan chronicler’s distrust of 
Florence, but it does also hint at the normal rules of warfare and the way in which 
they could be observed in the breach as much as the observance.104 In fact Honoré 
Bouvet, the influential clerical theoretician of war, noted in c.1390 that safe-conducts 
only bound those under the authority of the man who gave it, and were often broken 
in his own day.105  
At Capua in 1501 a group of citizens asked for a ‘parlamento’ with the French 
after only a few days of fighting.106 Capua capitulated, offering to pay no less than 
60,000 ducats,107 and six citizens were reportedly sent out crying ‘mercy’, probably in 
fear of a brutal sack. Contemporary reports of what turned into an infamous massacre 
suggest that there was some suspicion about a delay in the departure of the inhabitants 
or troops from the city and at this point in proceedings fearing betrayal ‘certain 
Gascons, Picards, and other infantry’ leapt through the breaches in the town walls 
created by the artillery crying ‘Sack! Sack!’ and prompting the defending troops to 
cry in alarm ‘Arms! Arms!’ This cry spurred the French troops, who could not be 
restrained by their captains, into furious action.108 The Perugian chronicler Francesco 
Matarazzo suggested that some of the inhabitants had opened a gate to the city but the 
French had ‘wished to make a good start and in coming in killed those who had 
betrayed their homeland’, before moving on to the rest of the inhabitants whom they 
slaughtered without pity or discrimination between sex or age.109 
Most devastatingly, in 1512 when Ravenna was menaced by victorious French 
troops the inhabitants decided to surrender with disastrous consequences.110 Local 
accounts suggest that the inhabitants of the city realized that they could not withstand 
the superior forces of the French and therefore sent representatives to conclude an 
agreement to provide supplies to the French. In the belief that an accord had been 
reached the city placed only a few guards on duty or, by another account, those 
Spanish patrolling the walls deliberately withdrew to the citadel, and when one of the 
city gates was opened in order to send food out to the camp, a large number of 
Gascons lodged in a nearby church went into battle mode. Seeing how weakly 
defended the gate was they entered incognito and spread throughout the city. On 
meeting some resistance the Gascons sacked the city, killing everyone and especially 
all of the peasants (‘masime tucto li contadino’).111 A Servite friar on the scene 
described how the French delegate came before Ravenna early on Easter Monday and 
‘in this way holding the place with their chatter the Gascons began to enter with such 
a storm that it seemed as if the infernal spirits were released’.112 He estimated that in 
the ‘eternal massacre’ (‘eterno exterminio’) around two thousand countrypeople 
(‘villani’) died, five thousand citizens, and eight to ten thousand women. He himself 
was thrown from a bell tower before escaping the city.113 
A critical factor in the case of the sack of Ravenna was the desperate need for 
food, and this difficulty of supplying large numbers of men also operated later the 
same year when the forces of the Holy League, determined to force Florence to oust 
the pro-French regime of Piero Soderini, threatened the neighbouring town of Prato. 
Rámon de Cardona, the viceroy and commander of the League’s forces, arrived 
outside the town with few artillery pieces but many hungry troops. He reportedly 
declared to his army that if they wished to eat they must acquire it with the arms in 
their hands and enter the city where there was food.114 In a letter to the Ten in 
Florence the podestà of Prato, Battista Guicciardini, described how a herald sent by 
Cardona was told that the city had not received supplies sufficient to supply their 
army and that the army which had arrived was bigger than expected. The herald 
dismissed this response as a delaying tactic, alleged that the supplies would never be 
forthcoming, and promised that the army would arrive the next morning.115 The 
battering of the walls began two days later and lasted all night, and an assault through 
a breach of the walls led to the massacre of around 5,600 persons by common 
opinion, although one later estimate suggests that civilian casualties were low but that 
around half of the joint militia in Prato (amounting to around three thousand men) 
was wiped out.116 
 
4. Revenge and Punishment 
 
The violence which followed the failure of formal negotiations was often amplified 
by the desire to avenge perceived affronts to honour and to punish rebellion. 
Sometimes soldiers acted to avenge a shame that they perceived to have been inflicted 
against their own nation,117 but often very minor incidents and insults are said to have 
caused the failure of the parley or to have sparked an assault. Leone Cobelli, a 
chronicler based near Mordano, evoked Gallic fury in a telling detail – one of the 
French captains reacted angrily to the death of fellow countryman, a gentleman, as a 
result of the shot of one of the gunners in the castle there, and cried: ‘Onward, to 
sack! To sack!’118 A single fatal shot to the head of a French constable taken by a 
‘fool’ (‘sciocco’) from the walls of Tremoleto during the parley in December 1496 led 
to its bloody sack by French who cried out: ‘Now it is our turn to wage a vendetta’.119 
In July 1501 a large stone thrown by a woman from the walls of a castle near Ariete at 
Vitellozzo Vitelli while he was at the foot of the wall demanding supplies and 
deciding if the castle could fight led to his immediately going into battle and resulted 
in the deaths of over one hundred men and four women (the first of whom killed was 
the stone thrower).120 
The captain of the papal troops at the castle of Aquila in June 1499 sacked the 
place with ‘great cruelty’ (‘gran crudeltade’), killed seventy-six men on guard there, 
with all the young women spoiled and the ancient women sold. All of this occurred 
because the hostage the captain had received from the castle had been returned, and 
had then made an agreement with the commander of the castle. The commander 
declared that he wished to fight, fired off ‘certain mortar-pieces’ (‘certe spingarde’) 
and killed one of the captain’s nephews, among others.121 One chronicler in Parma 
noted that a castle near the city surrendered to the French by agreement (‘a patto’) in 
June 1500, but ‘they were used in bad faith’ since two well-born citizens were 
beheaded and twelve brought in carts to be hanged from some willow trees in twos 
and threes, except for one who was spared after his wife pled on his behalf. The 
chronicler attributed this behaviour, the sack of the castle (even its bells were stolen) 
and the rape of women, to ‘quella insegna’ – a Sforza banner replacing that of the 
French – flown from the tower of the communal palace by a nobleman who was a 
supporter of Ludovico Sforza and an enemy of Parma.122 Finally, it was in retaliation 
for the killing of a German by the French that Como was sacked in December 1521 
when fifteen or twenty Spaniards entered the city crying ‘Sack! Sack!’ The marquis of 
Pescara, who was meant to protect the inhabitants of Como, was unable to restrain 
them ‘and was ready to be hanged’ for such a disgrace.123 
More gravely, at Monte San Giovanni in 1495 the inhabitants behaved with 
great dishonour towards the king. As the Venetian patrician Domenico Malipiero (or 
possibly Pietro Dolfin) recorded: ‘King Charles, having arrived near Monte San 
Giovanni, ordered two heralds to tell those in the fortress to surrender; but they 
hanged the heralds and the king joined battle with them, ruined the place and caused 
the deaths of many.’124 Marin Sanudo provided a longer account of the incident which 
specified that the heralds were not only hanged but had their noses and ears sliced off 
before being returned to the besiegers: ‘Which is a thing that never was customarily 
done to messengers.’125 The sack which followed is described in horrifying detail. In 
Sanudo’s account it was a bloodbath in which only babies and a few women were 
spared, churches provided no refuge, and the corpses of those who had rushed into the 
piazza to beg for mercy on their knees and with their arms crossed piled up unburied. 
Seven hundred were killed, no less than 25,000 ducats of booty taken, and a hard 
lesson delivered: ‘The king was content that such cruelty was used, as much for what 
had happened [to the heralds] as for the example to other castles and places of the 
kingdom so that they might not wish to defend themselves but rather hand the keys 
over to him.’126 Over a decade later the historian Sigismondo dei Conti da Foligno 
evoked Charles VIII’s reaction to the return of his messenger from Monte San 
Giovanni with his hands, nose and ears cut off and in doing so highlighted both the 
behaviour to be expected of a king and the rules of military behaviour that had been 
offended: ‘Moved by the pitiful laments and by the mutilated appearance of a man 
dear to him, he threw aside his dinner, and swore that the violators of the ius gentium 
[Law of Nations] would, before he sat down again to dine, pay the penalty.’127 
Charles VIII himself noted that the local lord had refused supplies and passage 
to his army and had waged war on his friends, that the place was known for its 
strength, and that he was advised that it would cause him trouble if he did not reduce 
it to obedience ‘by friendship or by force.’128 In a letter, which was soon printed in 
France, Charles wrote to his brother about the bombardment and successful assault on 
the renowned fortress which he witnessed: ‘At last, by the grace of God, by the said 
first assault it was taken at little cost to myself but at their expense, punishment, and 
as great loss for the people [and an example] to others who would wish to do the same 
in their encounter with me. And believe [me] that the trouble that they have given me 
to go see them has been dearly sold.’129 It was, he wrote happily a few days later, ‘the 
most beautiful pleasure in the world, the like of which I have never seen.’130 
As these words suggest and as the historian Bernardo Rucellai, quoted at the 
beginning of this chapter, pointed out in his account of the massacre at Gaeta in 1495, 
the force used against a city which was deemed to transgress the laws of war or to be 
in rebellion could be severe. This was clearly spelled out in 1509 by the anonymous 
author of an unpublished ‘Panegirica’ for King Louis XII when he touched on the 
king’s quelling of the Genoese rebellion two years earlier: 
 
To other victors, by the law of war, the city would have been destroyed, 
pillaged and burnt, with murder and homicides committed under the law of 
victory. You [i.e. Louis] bridled and checked victory, which is by nature 
proud, insolent, bloody, ravishing and full of pride, and forced it to abide by 
your customs. Churches and the chastity of women and daughters were never 
more religiously guarded in peacetime than they were at your victory. No fire 
was seen unless as a sign of public joy, no sword was viewed after your 
victory unless sheathed, and none of the wealth of this great and flourishing 
city was hidden away. Everything was on display, every maiden accompanied 
by her mother, every wife with her husband’s mother, [and] no banishments 
and no escapes.131  
 
The ‘law of war’ and the ‘law of victory’ could have a very liberal interpretation 
indeed, as will be shown in part III, and while Genoa was spared a massacre in 1507 it 
would suffer at the hands of the Spanish fifteen years later. 
In the same vein in 1509 the French king, mindful of the loyalty owed to him 
as the Milanese ruler, vanquished the Venetians at the remaining former Milanese 
possession of Peschiera and, having taken it by force (‘per forza’), left not a man alive 
in the fortress except for the captain, the podestà and the proveditore.132 When the 
prisoners were led before the king they presented a hundred thousand ducats ransom, 
but the king declared: ‘The devil if I never drink or eat before they are hanged and 
strangled.’ The pleas of some men in his entourage were in vain and the men were 
hanged.133 The effects of this act were rapid: ‘Once the news was known in Venice 
and in their other towns of the defeat in battle and of the capture and execution of 
those in Peschiera, forty days afterwards all the inhabitants of the said towns, men and 
women, dressed in black’ and handed over their keys to the king.134 In France, even 
the author of the otherwise unstinting ‘Panegirica’ of Louis XII hesitated in his praise 
of the king when he came to describe the ‘lake of blood’ caused by the capture of 
Peschiera that seemed to stand in contrast to the king’s glorious and happy victories 
up until that moment.135 
It was a similar claim of right of possession and just punishment for rebellion 
that allowed Gaston de Foix to inflict a massacre on the city of Brescia in 1512. The 
French governor of Brescia learned of a conspiracy with the Venetians to regain their 
city, part of the mainland empire from 1426 until its capture by the French in 1509. 
The French king would not pardon such a ‘rebellione’ against his authority and the 
city was to be retaken and no life or goods to be spared.136 Gaston de Foix acted on 
this intention and took the city by force, enacting a cruel vengeance (‘crudel 
vendetta’) for its rebellion according to a pro-French set of verses: ‘The persecution 
was great and a number of the local inhabitants and strangers dead, and in the houses 
they were tortured and afflicted, and it was useless to cry for mercy or for pardon. No 
other land has ever been in such a state: the streets full of bodies and only the cries of 
“Sack! Iron! Death!” It would bring ancient Troy to your mind.’137  
As Gaston de Foix immediately wrote to the marquis of Mantua: ‘Having 
made some attempt to recall this city to its original royal devotion, and after two days 
seeing that it wished in no way to retreat from its stubborn position, so it was taken by 
force in order to lose no more time’. Foix related how he entered the castle, joined 
with the French troops who had held out there during the Venetian occupation, and in 
rain and great danger due to artillery bombardment had descended into the city 
fighting constantly. With God’s favour for a just cause, as he put it, Foix had taken 
Brescia after three hours’ bitter fighting and had put it to the sack and taken 
significant prisoners, including the army commissioner Andrea Gritti.138  
In his account of the taking of Brescia, directed at his cousin Margaret of 
Austria, King Louis XII noted that the city had revolted against him and needed to 
brought into obedience. He suggested that Gaston de Foix had done everything he 
could to avoid a pillage, but the inhabitants were obstinate and had refused to listen to 
reason and so consequently an assault had been launched.139 By the grace of God, he 
continued, this assault was successful and they cut to pieces all the men of war and ‘a 
good number of peasants that they had put in the said town.’ This was good news and 
he hoped that it would bring about a ‘good end’ to the wars and a universal peace in 
Christendom, which was a desire close to his heart.140 
 
5. Plunder 
 
The rewards of such sacks could be vast; one Frenchman estimated the booty from the 
sack of Brescia at 3 million écus, while the sack of Vico, near Sorrento in 1528 by 
forty men-at-arms gave them 1,200 écus apiece.141 It was said that some French were 
made so wealthy by the sack of Brescia that it supported them and their children all 
their lives.142 According to military theorists the desire for such plunder weakened 
military discipline. Typical is the general complaint of Girolamo Muzio, the author of 
Il duello (The Duel) (1550) and other works, in the preface to Lauro Gorgieri’s 
Trattato della guerra, del soldato, del castellano, et come ha da essere uno general di 
essercito (Treatise on War, the Soldier, the Castellan, and on How to be the General 
of an Army) (1555): ‘Truly our age has need of such a book as this given that the 
military profession is so corrupted and it is in need of a complete reformation.’143 In 
particular, he blamed this state on the corrupting effect of money, which was freely 
given to those who ran after the drum without any consideration of their quality or 
condition, and which was the basis on which ranks were determined. Moreover, 
badly-paid soldiers were licentious and disobedient, the taxes raised for them a burden 
on the people, and the householder no longer master where they lodged. He argued 
that whether they passed through friendly or hostile territory soldiers were thieves. 
Not only that, but these faults had gone uncorrected by those who were no less to be 
blamed, wars had been waged for base reasons (‘per appetito’) rather than for a just 
cause and had been declared illegitimately, while bad faith in truces and failure to 
follow the rules governing plunder and prisoners were also noted. The ancient, true 
and well regulated military discipline outlined in Gorgieri’s book would offer a mirror 
to modern princes, captain and soldiers and lead them to reform themselves and lead 
the military profession back ‘to the rule of its ancient devotion [religione].’144 
Such criticism needs to be treated with caution. In the first place, the sack, like 
its prelude the siege, followed a universally recognized set of rules.145 One historian 
of violence against civilians during this period has attempted to put a slightly more 
dignified gloss on the whole matter, arguing that soldiers were not simply provoked 
and driven to irrational cruelty, and civilians were not simply passive victims of 
violence, and has likened their relationship to that of an army at a city gates 
bargaining over terms: ‘It has become clear that violence was an instrument in 
negotiations over money that were directed under the threat of force.’146 This is 
obvious in the case of ransoming and kidnapping and is a point that hardly needs to be 
laboured. But such forceful ‘negotiation’ was as much an outcome of chronic and 
structural problems of military pay, supply, and accommodation as it was a product of 
the desperate actions of criminals and other ‘scum’ washed up in the army ‘crime 
machines’ suggested by John Hale.147  
The pay of Swiss mercenaries and German landsknecht troops was good, 
around twice that earned by an agricultural labourer and comparable with the wages 
of a skilled artisan, but as inflation rose in the course of the century it may have lost 
its value.148 Nevertheless, Swiss shoemakers and butcher’s sons, or youths (some 
barely into their teens) struggling with debt, poverty, or other difficulties at home 
frequently sought wealth on campaign in Italy. As Peter Falk of Freibourg wrote 
home while on the march towards Milan and Pavia in 1512: ‘Never have our 
comrades seen such splendid and wealthy encampments as these that we have had up 
until now in town and country. Everything that a man could desire has been found in 
sufficiency. The soldiers are full of money and marvelous things that belonged to the 
French and have been harvested everywhere … We are so happy and in such good 
heart for which we thank the Lord God for eternity.’149  
It seems, though, that the French occupation of Italy could not be adequately 
financed by its possessions there: ‘At best the Italian possessions assured an 
equilibrium between income and expenditure.’150 This shortfall, the failure of 
sufficient funds to arrive from France, and the problematic practice of paying troops 
through their captains therefore increased the demands made on civilians, especially 
when the prices of goods and services on the road, including the cost of prostitutes, 
rose and caused the real value of a soldier’s pay to depreciate.151 The experience of 
Spanish troops in Italy followed a similar pattern.152 The mercenary commanders, or 
condottieri, were awarded a right to plunder and ransoms according to the terms of 
their contract.153 However, the ordinary soldier might receive little of the plunder or 
rewards obtained by his superiors, which probably explains some sacks, like that of 
Rome, which took place in the absence of a strong commander or, like that of Genoa 
in 1522, as a result of a fear that an agreement had been reached by another 
commander.154 It also explains Pope Julius II’s decision at the siege of Mirandola in 
1511 to give in to the desire of the poor infantry (‘poveri fanti’) for a discretionary 
sack (‘a descritione’) rather than rely on distribution of a ‘taglione’ or fine paid to the 
commander, the duke of Urbino.155  
The problem was familiar to military men. In 1494 the commander Galeazzo 
Sanseverino reported to the duke of Milan a conversation with French archers and 
gentlemen outside the king’s lodging in Florence about the fact that the Florentines 
were still in arms and the French ‘avid for plunder’ (‘cupidi de preda’). The danger 
that a ‘very great scandal with much loss of blood’ would occur as a result of this 
tense situation led him to advise the king to keep the troops in the city in good 
order.156 As he wrote a few days later the situation was not helped by the great want 
of victuals in the city as the French lived at the expense of the country, did not pay the 
price of the things taken, despite orders for them to do so (as in Lombardy), and were 
also resorting to theft.157 Another chronicler described how troops of all nations 
crowded into Verona for their winter quarters in December 1509, enjoying reasonable 
food and putting the whole of the Veronese to plunder (‘in preda’). Since the Germans 
were unpaid they sacked the piazza in Verona three times a day and they were so 
hungry that they were only interested in edible plunder.158 Imperial troops, who left 
Vicenza by an accord with the Venetians the previous month, had clearly behaved 
little better for they found that while they were at arms on the piazza their recent 
payment of cloth was covered with excrement, urine, and hot water, and thrown into 
the street from the windows of their locked lodgings. The Vicentines shouted at them 
to go as the Venetians were coming.159 
The use of force in ‘negotiations’ undertaken during sacks of cities could 
successfully extract gold coins from civilians, but also a range of objects including 
religious paintings, worked wood ceilings and other carved or engraved items, parts 
of building facades, relics from Naples, bronze door panels from the castle at Naples, 
humanist manuscripts, a Hebrew bible, the Sforza dinner service, and more than 
13,000 lire worth of pawns held by the monte di pietà or lending bank in Ravenna.160 
A similar array of valuable items attracted the attentions of marauding French and 
Savoyard soldiers in Spanish Lombardy in 1636.161  
The inventory of plunder taken at the sack of Prato in 1512 reveals that the 
Spanish on that occasion took a fairly representative sample of humble household 
goods ranging in condition from old, used and worn (‘vecchio’ or ‘uso’ and ‘tristo’) to 
new (‘nuovo’), and were easily portable, could be consumed or used, or easily resold. 
Those robbed at Prato made claims for many pieces of cloth and a variety of clothing 
including women’s dresses (‘gammurra’), hooded garments (‘cioppetta monachina’), 
and cloaks (such as the ‘saltambarcha romagnuiolo’), sleeves and linings.162 There 
were also claims submitted to the authorities for plundered grain and flour, basins and 
other vessels (some tin), hats, hoods, hangings, mattresses, candlesticks, tools, soap, 
chains, bells, knives, silver forks, leather work, including scabbards, a bronze mortar, 
a pair of spicer’s balances, and part of a crossbow, and the carts and asses (and one 
horse) to transport it to market or to camp.163  
As Brian Sandberg has noted for the French Wars of Religion later in the 
century, and as Gregory Hanlon has found for seventeenth-century Lombardy, such 
goods could be pressed into use by soldiers and their followers or sold quickly in 
public auctions in town squares by sutlers, officers, and camp followers.164 In a letter 
to Florence the orators in Prato advised that the Spanish should be given safe 
conducts to come to Florence to sell their booty otherwise, being constrained to leave 
it behind, they would burn it together with the town.165 However, some Spaniards 
found in Florence selling goods stolen in the sack of Prato were killed, and 
‘deservedly’ (‘e meritamente’) according to one chronicler.166 Here were the laws of 
war (and defeat) as observed by civilians. 
 
6. National or Ethnic Identities 
 
These material needs and desires could be exacerbated by a highly-developed sense of 
Spanish camarada, French esprit de corps, or by the German landsknechts’ sense of 
self-importance fostered by their tight corporate identity and exhibited in arrogant 
behaviour towards civilians.167 The breakdown into violence and looting of the 
normal and relatively restrained relationship of military demand and civilian supply 
could occur as a result of a broad range of socio-economic factors including 
differences in national identity and language, the lack of kinship bonds and length of 
occupation. Thus, it has been claimed that the highly multi-national armies of the 
Thirty Years’ War had much less compunction about casting off restraint to take what 
they needed or to seize valuable plunder with violence from those who shared none of 
these bonds.168 
Much the same might be said of the ‘ethnic mosaic’ which was the Army of 
Flanders on the eve of its round of brutal sacks and massacres in 1572, and of course 
of the armies of the Italian Wars.169 Nationalist hostility was certainly widespread: in 
December 1529 in the wake of the fall of Barletta which was burnt to the ground by 
defending troops, the imperial general Hernando Marquis of Alarcón warned the 
emperor: ‘Italy is by its nature more cruel and vengeful as your majesty sees with 
time’. He went on to assert that Italy could not be dominated without force and when 
the contrary was used it was attributed to weakness of power or spirit. Therefore there 
ought to be some reformation and measures taken to ensure security – such as good 
fortifications and the placing of troops in the captured places.170  
Of course, Guicciardini also identified the supposed natural ferocity of the 
French as an important factor behind the slaughter, while his contemporaries early on 
fingered the Swiss pike men as indiscriminate and harsh killers, as demonstrated at 
the battle of Rapallo in 1494.171 The reports of the behaviour of the Swiss – and 
possibly German landsknechts, who might include Swiss recruits – there and 
elsewhere conform to observations made by contemporaries about their doggedness, 
boldness and effectiveness in open battle, and explains why the French and other 
powers spent so much to hire them. These critical reports are also consonant with 
widespread complaints about the difficulty of disciplining them, their unreliability, 
and their focus on financial reward with a consequent tendency to pillage.172  
However, the story of why massacres happened suggests that mass murder 
was not a straightforward outcome of the increased use of Swiss troops, nor a result of 
natural French bellicosity, but could be a product of rivalries among commanders and 
companies which sometimes overlapped with national loyalties and which persisted 
within the markedly multi-national armies of the period.173 These armies were highly 
international and in the list of payments of men-at-arms in Spanish service in Naples 
in 1508, 1509, and 1510 may be found a certain ‘Johan Marca de la Mirandola’ in 
Don Juan Cardona’s company.174 The presence of Italian companies or individuals 
within the Spanish, French, or imperial forces therefore complicates the nationalist 
model, and while the majority of massacres were principally ascribed to Gascons or 
German and Swiss landsknechts this may reflect a bias in the (largely Italian) sources 
and as some contemporaries observed, Italians soon picked up these barbarian habits. 
 
Of course, a number of different factors could operate at once as in the case of the 
Venetian outpost of Trevi (now Treviglio) which was punished by sack, massacre, 
and a threat of demolition for its surrender to the French in May 1509. Indeed, it was 
reported in Ravenna that the Venetians there held a ‘solemn ceremony’ (‘festa 
solena’) for the reacquisition of Trevi and ‘for the greater happiness of its people 
burned a great number of its books of condemnation and other tax records’.175 
Contemporary reports, though, suggest that the devastation may also have been 
exacerbated by the need to provision the depleted forces of one of the mercenary 
companies employed by Venice and by a strategic calculation, akin to the destruction 
of suburbs undertaken by cities facing siege, that Trevi might provide a useful base 
for French incursions and should therefore be levelled.176 
 There may also have been factors involved in the outbreak of violence which 
cannot be so readily traced in the existing sources: for example, reflecting on the 
extravagant atrocities inflicted on some civilians John Hale once remarked that it was 
tempting ‘to see the rape of the town as another form of the peasants’ revenge, so 
many of the men in armies being … of peasant or village origin.’177 Certainly, 
Marcello Alberini recalled that during the sack of Rome those who tried to leave the 
city were assaulted by the countrypeople (‘villani’) who had an ancient hatred of the 
Romans.178 Such thoughts probably passed through the minds of soldiers at some 
point in the wars, just as national, ethnic, or religious divisions and hatreds may have 
operated at times to precipitate and exacerbate the conflict.  
It is also clear that just as anger, inebriation, and other irrational forces could 
prompt or prolong massacres,179 so too such events might be the product of army 
discipline and structure, and even esprit de corps, with company commanders 
breaking truces or ignoring peace settlements to gain a financial advantage for their 
men, and companies of soldiers bonded by their national origins and keen to prove 
themselves to each other organizing the entry and sack of towns. In his colloquy 
Militis et Cartusiani (The Soldier and the Carthusian) first printed in 1523 Erasmus 
had the Carthusian friar accuse the impoverished and maimed soldier of ‘enjoying a 
life of great wretchedness and sin’, with the soldier replying: ‘Having so many 
partners in wrongdoing distorted my sense of wrong.’180  
In sum, while soldiers might sometimes regret their cruel actions and 
contemporaries might blame their passions, failings, and sinfulness for their behavior, 
it seems clear that the violence of mass murder was often sanctioned by princely or 
military authorities. This hard expression of power, what Machiavelli later 
memorably called ‘pious cruelty’ or ‘honorable wickedness’, was a tried and tested 
strategy with a full panoply of justifications.181 It might be framed as a final resort, an 
expression of divine justice, or as a punishment and correction for human sin and 
rebellion, but the cold truth is that it involved the harsh treatment or murder of 
thousands of men, women, and children whose experiences are explored in the next 
chapter.  
The experience of civilians during such events and ‘negotiations’ ranged from 
the wholly irrational and fearful to practical and organized efforts in defence by which 
they became, as one chronicler of the siege of Pavia in 1524-5 put it, ‘poor little 
citizen-soldiers’ (‘i poveretti cittadini soldati’).182 It is this range of experiences, 
which taken together provide a more complete and complex view of the nature of the 
massacre during the Italian Wars, that is presented in the next chapter. These 
experiences of massacre, like its causes, display many common features that have 
been identified with civilian experiences in other pre-modern and modern conflicts. In 
particular, certain groups like clerics, Jews and women, including prostitutes and 
nuns, suffered difficulties both as a result of the actions of attacking soldiers but also 
as a consequence of civilian attacks. Finally, it is also apparent that the evidence for 
the involvement of women in military management and a range of warlike activities 
challenges traditional categories of civilian and combatant that were the focus for 
intense debate by just war theorists.  
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